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Scarce radio spectrum is assigned to mobile network operators (MNOs) by national regulatory 
authorities (NRAs). Spectrum is usually assigned by beauty contest or an auction. The process requires 
that winners make a payment to the government. MNOs seek scarce spectrum to enable the provision 
of wireless services for profit. While MNOs are imperfectly aware of their costs, NRAs rely solely on 
MNOs for this information. As such, NRAs set spectrum assignment conditions (including minimum 
bid price) largely ignorant of MNO operating conditions. This study examines the performance of 3G 
auction outcomes in terms of the prices paid by winners via an econometric analysis of a unique 
sample of national 3G spectrum auctions. These winning bids depend on national and mobile market 
conditions, spectrum package attributes, license process, and post-award operator requirements. 
Finally, model estimation accounts for the censored nature of these data. 
Keywords 
Mobile telephone markets, spectrum allocation, spectrum bid price 




Radio spectrum is a scarce (non-depletable and non-storable natural) resource that is exclusively 
licensed (Faulhaber and Farber, 2002; Faulhaber, 2006). Under International Telecommunication 
Union (ITU) guidance scarce spectrum is allocated to mobile network operators (MNOs) by national 
regulatory authorities (NRAs). Historically, user assignment is by government fiat. However, in the 
1990s, faced with emerging competitive mobile telephone markets a more arms-length process of 
spectrum allocation developed (McMillan, 1994; Gans et al., 2005). 
In particular, NRA spectrum licensing policy must decide on: (a) whether to set a single standard 
(or allow technological system competition); (b) how many licenses to award; and (c) the method to 
award licenses. With mobile telecommunications licenses awarded initially on a first-come-first-
serve basis to (incumbent) fixed-line telecommunications operators, subsequent licence awards are 
made by auction or through an administrative tender procedure (e.g., ‘beauty contest’), possibly 
including a licence fee (Gruber, 2001: 62).
1 Beauty contests require that MNOs submit plans or bids 
to NRAs including spectrum use plans. After hearing proposals, NRAs award spectrum to MNOs that 
present the most ‘attractive’ proposals.
2 With a lottery, regulatory authorities randomly select licence 
winners from among network operator submitted applications.
3 
The principal argument for auction-based spectrum allocation is that it promotes efficient use via 
competition among applicants. That is, operators with higher valuations are likely to bid more for the 
spectrum resource. Another advantage of auctions is that this competition is not wasteful as spectrum 
licence revenues substitute for distortionary taxation.
4 Finally, auctions are a more transparent means 
to assign licenses than administrative processes (Cramton, 2002: 608).
5 For NRA allocations to be 
efficient (accurately reflect the true economic value of the spectrum) auctions must be designed 
carefully.
6 A complication is that auctions are embedded within administrative processes that specify 
the amount of spectrum allocated (and other spectrum package attributes), award conditions, and post-
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1  Until recently spectrum is made available without charge. The approach is inefficient, e.g., idle ‘white’ spectrum or rigid 
allocations do not respond to changes in demand (Hazlett, 2001). Alternative spectrum fee options include: once off 
upfront, recurring lease and real-time congestion fees. Upfront payments presently dominate (Bauer, 2003). 
2  Beauty contests suffer from several problems. First, they are extremely slow and wasteful. Competitors spend vast sums 
trying to influence the regulator’s decisions. Second, beauty contests lack transparency (Cramton, 2002: 607). 
3  Since spectrum licences are valuable there is an incentive for many firms to apply. Large numbers of applicants waste 
resources in creating and processing applications. Moreover, the winners are not necessarily best suited to provide a 
service (Cramton, 2002: 607-8). 
4  Typical estimates are that deadweight losses are between 17 and 56 cents for every extra $1 raised in taxes (Ballard et al., 
1985). 
5  Despite their virtues, standard auctions at best ensure that the bidder with the highest private value wins, rather than the 
bidder with the highest social value. Private and social values can diverge in these auctions because the winners will be 
competing in a marketplace. One collection of winners may lead to a more collusive industry structure. For example, a 
license may be worth more to an incumbent than a new entrant, simply because of the greater market power the 
incumbent would enjoy without the new entrant (Cramton, 2002: 608). 
6  However, it is not straightforward translating theoretically-efficient designs into practice with recent auctions seriously 
flawed (Klemperer, 2002b). Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
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award financial and network performance operator obligations. For instance, ‘too high’ up-front 
licence fees (spectrum bid price) either forces the exit of firms or provides a signal for post-entry 
collusion (Gruber, 2001, 2002).
7 Additionally, high licence fees constrain subsequent network 
investment when financed through debt, with higher capital costs leading to slower network 
expansion.  
While operator bidding is driven by expected profit considerations and not societal welfare 
(Klemperer, 2002a: 177), efficient spectrum assignment (or maximizing the sum of the valuations of 
operators awarded the licenses) is the principal aim of most NRAs (Klemperer, 2002b: 844).
8 
However, whether an auction allocation is efficient cannot be directly observed, only whether the 
auction process is apparently competitive (based on the number of bidders and their activity) and the 
winning spectrum bid price (Klemperer, 2002b: 844). This study examines 3G spectrum award 
outcomes in terms of the spectrum winning bids paid by winners through the econometric analysis of a 
unique sample of national 3G spectrum allocations. These spectrum winning bids are modeled as 
depending on national economic and mobile market conditions, spectrum package attributes, the 
licensing process, and post-award operator obligations. Finally, the analysis explicitly takes into 
account the censored nature of these data, viz., only in certain successful award processes are non-zero 
spectrum winning bids observed. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews selected advanced economy mobile telephony 
and spectrum assignment process evolution, while Section 3 lists factors that potentially affect MNO 
spectrum valuations. In Section 4 descriptive information concerning sample data is provided, and 
variables in the empirical analysis are defined. Prior to model estimation, national 3G award sample 
descriptive statistics are calculated in Section 5. The censored regression model used for econometric 
estimation is specified in Section 6, while estimation results are reported in Section 7. A final section 
suggests some modeling extensions. 
2. Mobile Telephony and Spectrum Assignment 
Mobile communications rapidly evolved since the 1980s introduction of (voice only) first generation 
analogue systems (Gruber and Hoenicke, 1999). This technology is characterized by relatively low 
network capacity and large handset size (Grant, 2005). Subsequent second generation (2G) technology 
developments are in response to demand for enhanced voice and data services (Gruber and Hoenicke, 
1999). Digitally-based 2G systems also benefited from unified European standards. However, the 
European Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) and the United States (US) based Time 
Division Multiple Access (TDMA) and Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems remained 
incompatible, limiting opportunity for global roaming (ITU, 2003).
 9 Despite this limitation, the 2G 
mobile to fixed-line penetration ratio rose rapidly in advanced economies (see Table 1).  
 
                                                      
7  It is widely accepted that once the right to operate in a market is obtained entry costs are sunk and therefore 
inconsequential for subsequent pricing and investment decisions. License fees are important for later firm decisions only 
in as far as they appropriately reflect the ongoing opportunity costs of spectrum. Deviations between license fees and the 
opportunity costs (both over- and underpayment) only affect the distribution of rents between the shareholders and the 
public sector (Cave and Valletti, 2000). However, this line of reasoning holds only if stringent assumptions as to the 
competitiveness of the mobile market, the working of capital markets, and the dynamics of sector adjustment hold. If 
these assumptions are modified to better reflect the institutional and economic features of the mobile industry, license 
fees may have less benign effects on sector evolution. The potential distortion of pricing and investment decisions is 
higher for fees that are fixed upfront, as they lock in the sector outlook at one moment in time without opportunities to 
adjust once more information on the true market conditions is revealed (Noam, 1998). 
8  That is, operators only submit bids when their expected profits are non-negative (Bauer, 2003). 
9  GSM and TDMA divide a carrier channel into time slots, digitally encoding the signal onto these time slots. CDMA uses 
spread-spectrum technology, as used in 3G systems (Cabral and Salant, 2009: 2). An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
3 
Table 1. Ratio of Mobile to Fixed-line Penetration 
Region/Country 1992  2002 
    
EU 0.04  1.58 
    
Japan 0.03  1.33 
    
US 0.08  0.75 
    
Note: Penetration is the number of subscribers per 100 populations for 1G and 2G systems. Source: ITU World 
Telecommunications Indicators Database (2008). 
Greater European (1.58) relative to US (0.75) growth is in part explained by the European Union (EU) 
delegating standard setting to a central body, the European Technical Standards Institute. By contrast, 
the US Federal Communications Commission grants operators the right to select standards, resulting 
in handset incompatibility (Gandal et al., 2003).
 More recent, third generation (3G) mobile telephony 
developments address the need for global compatibility, multi-media services provision and greater 
speed. 
Electromagnetic spectrum is required to provide wireless communication services. ITU World 
Radio Conferences (WRCs) allocate spectrum bands to specific uses. In 1992, the WRC IMT-2000 
project defines standards for the deployment of 3G systems.
10 However, international frequency band 
coordination proves difficult, viz., only in 2000 is 3G service provision designated to three frequency 
bands (Gruber, 2005: 225).
 11 National governments assign network operators to the pre-determined 
frequencies. Methods used by NRAs to assign spectrum licenses include: beauty contests; auctions; 
lotteries; and first-come-first-served methods. The first-come-first-serve mode dominated initial 
claims for electromagnetic spectrum for the delivery of commercial broadcasting and military 
services. The method however does not ensure that licenses are assigned to the bidder with the highest 
spectrum valuation. Lotteries are an alternative process whereby assignments are made randomly to 
applicants. Also, lottery processes do not guarantee efficient allocation.
12 More recently, beauty 
contests are widely employed in Asia and Europe to assign spectrum, whereby applications are rated 
by proposed service deployment characteristics, and social impact. Hazlett (1998) argues that beauty 
contests are inherently politically compromised and socially wasteful; while Cartelier (2003) notes that 
the possibility of NRAs being ‘captured’ is higher in beauty contests than other procedures because of 
asymmetric information and lobbying.
 13 
Herzel (1951) proposed auctioning TV licenses as a way to let the market determine the color TV 
standard. Later, Coase (1959) developed the entire property rights approach to spectrum assignment. 
Legislation granting NRAs authority to auction spectrum first occurred in New Zealand (1989), 
followed by the UK (1990) and the US (1993). Auctions award spectrum based on bids received. As 
assignments are based on spectrum bid prices, they are regarded as efficient assignment models that 
are less susceptible to lobbying behavior and information asymmetry (Vickrey, 1961; Cramton, 2002: 
606; Cartelier, 2003).
14 However, Vickrey’s (1961) revenue equivalence theorem requires independent 
                                                      
10  The WRC in 1992 is principally used to allocate spectrum for 2G services, however, a small part of the spectrum was set 
aside for 3G services (Gruber, 2005: 231). 
11  This is due in part to much of the proposed frequency bands in the US allocated to 2G systems and the military (Gruber, 
2005: 225). 
12  For this reason auctions replaced lotteries in the US in 1993 (McMillan, 1995). 
13  Regulatory capture occurs where the regulator acts in the interest of the firms rather than society. 
14  However, constant market evolution means the risk of winner’s curse is pervasive in spectrum auctions (Cartelier, 2003). Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
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private spectrum valuations and risk neutrality across bidders. In practice these assumptions are 
unlikely to hold. Accordingly, careful NRA auction design is required to ensure efficiency and 
revenue maximization are achieved. Thus, NRA auction designs potentially impact on realized 
spectrum winning bids.  
3. Factors affecting MNO Spectrum Valuations 
The fundamental motivation for MNOs to acquire spectrum is to enable the provision of wireless 
services for profit (Klemperer, 2002a). When a firm assesses an opportunity to acquire spectrum 
offered for licence by an NRA, the ultimate consideration is whether it is in the operator’s best interest 
to do so, viz., is spectrum purchase profitable? An MNO (Operator j) assesses this opportunity based 
on the conditions  ij ij rb 0 −> , where  ij r  is the projected net revenue from use of spectrum package i  
by  Operator j (based on spectrum award conditions, and operating revenue and cost estimates) 
through the licence period and  ij b  is the final spectrum bid price made by the operator for the 
spectrum resource. Further, the quantity 
min
ij ij b b0 − >  is the bid premium an operator offers to obtain 
the spectrum licence, i.e., the excess above the reserve bid price (
min
i b ) required by the NRA in the 
tender document. Premiums mostly arise when the process is competitive.
15 That is, the award value 
must not only exceed the minimum required spectrum bid price but be the largest value among all 
bidders. The spectrum assignment is efficient when the bid price accurately reflects the underlying 
opportunity costs of the firm.
16 When 
min
ij ij rb 0 − <  then no bid is made as the operator incurs losses in 
providing 3G service over the spectrum. Therefore, from the published spectrum awards, data 
observable to the analyst is the winner’s bid price, 
*
ij b . When there is no bid (and hence no winner) or 
the winning bid just equals the reserve price then 
*
ij b    is censored at a zero value. 
Factors that potentially impact on the winning spectrum bid price that are identified by the 
literature include spectrum package attributes. Attributes considered in the analysis are: the award date 
(Klemperer, 2002a), licence duration (Klemperer, 2002a), whether the package is revised (re-offered; 
Klemperer, 2002a), whether an entrant must be awarded a licence (Klemperer, 2002a), and the 
magnitude of the required minimum bid (reserve) price (Burguet and Sakovics, 1996; Klemperer, 
2002a). Variables that describe the licence award process include the size of the upfront deposit 
(Hazlett, 2001) and the competitiveness of the process (Klemperer, 2002b). Additionally, operator 
post-award financial and network performance obligations can impact on the award spectrum bid 
price. A financial performance obligation variable considered is annual license fees (Bauer, 2003), 
while network performance obligation variables included are infrastructure sharing, and population 
coverage and timing (Klemperer, 2002b). Finally, exogenous variables that reflect national economic 
and mobile market conditions, respectively, are national income (Börgers and Dustmann, 2003) and 
population density (Klemperer, 2002b), and the competitiveness of domestic mobile telephony 
markets (Klemperer, 2002a). Whether Asian market spectrum winning bids are distinct is also 
considered.
17 
                                                      
15  Examples include auctions held in the United Kingdom (2000), Germany (2000), the Netherlands (2000), New Zealand 
(2001), Denmark (2001), Taiwan (2002), Indonesia (2006) and Estonia (2007). A winning bid may reflect an accurate 
assessment of the profitability of spectrum under the advertised award conditions or an error in judgement by the 
operator. For instance, the winning bid could be the result of the ‘winner’s curse’ whereby the winning bid may be the 
result of a naïve bidder’s largest positive error (Gruber, 2002: 66; Scanlan, 2001: 695). 
16  Standard auctions (at best) ensure that the bidder with the highest private value wins, rather than the highest social value. 
Private and social values diverge as the winners compete in a marketplace (Cramton, 2002: 608). 
17  Spectrum lot size and license availability are implicitly controlled for in the regression equation. In particular, the 
dependent variable (WBID) is adjusted for the amount of spectrum in each license. Namely, the winning bid is US$m per 
MHz per million population. The number of licenses up for auction enters via the competition variable ACOMP. Namely, 
ACOMP = Licenses/Bidders. Additionally, an anonymous referee has pointed out that the availability of substitutable 
spectrum now and in the future is likely to affect spectrum valuations.  An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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4. Data and Variables 
For the purpose of econometric estimation these data are drawn from the DotEcon Spectrum Awards 
database. Table 2 lists sample 3G spectrum auctions comprising the data set for the period 2000–2007. 
Importantly, these data are comprised of 23 cases (national spectrum awards), which does not equal 
the number of observations. That is, the 83 observations (individual national spectrum licenses 
tendered for auction) are mostly multiple-licence national auctions.
18 Namely, several national licenses 
are on offer simultaneously, and accordingly in a well designed auction it would be expected that 
equivalent licenses would sell for equivalent prices. That is, national auction winning bids are not truly 
independent of other winning licence bid values. The resulting compressed bid value range in part 
reflects common underlying macroeconomic and market conditions, and other strategic information 
available to bidders. Further, and perhaps more importantly, this limited winning bid value range also 
reflects different information sets available to operators (e.g., incumbents and entrants) and 
uncertainty about rival bidder behavior. However, while the precision of individual estimates may be 
more difficult to ascertain, they remain unbiased and consistent.  
Table 2. 3G Spectrum Auctions, 2000–07 
Country Auction  Commenced Licenses Offered  Licence Awarded
      
United Kingdom  April 2000  5  5 
Germany June  2000  6  6 
Netherlands July  2000  5  5 
Italy October  2000  5  5 
Austria November  2000  6  6 
Switzerland December  2000  4 4 
New Zealand  January 2001  4  4 
Belgium March  2001  4  3 
Singapore April  2001  4  3 
Greece   July 2001  4  3 
Denmark September  2001  4  4 
Czech Republic  December 2001  4  2 
Israel December  2001  5  3 
Taiwan February  2002  5  5 
Norway September  2003  1  1 
Bulgaria March  2005  3  3 
Latvia April  2005  1  1 
Denmark December  2005  1  1 
Georgia May  2006  3  3 
Indonesia February  2006  3  3 
Estonia January  2007  1  1 
Nigeria March  2007  4  4 
Norway December  2007  1  1 
      
Total   83  76 
      
Source: DotEcon Spectrum Awards database coverage. 
Table 2 shows that it is only between March and December 2001 that licenses are not awarded. 
Accordingly, the auctions in Table 2 are separated into ‘regimes’ to test whether relatively high 
reserve prices from Regime One continue into Regime Two (when spectrum valuations are lower). 
Whilst Table 3 shows that reserve prices fall across each regime, this difference is only statistically 
                                                      
18  The exception of auctioning a single licence occurs only in five cases (Norway 2003, Latvia 2005, Denmark 2005, 
Norway 2007 and Estonia 2007). Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
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significant across Regime Two and Regime Three.
19 Therefore, licenses may go unsold in 2001 due to 
legacy RESERVE levels remaining constant while valuations fall. 
Table 3. 3G Spectrum Auctions by Winning Bid and Reserve Price 
Country Auction  Commenced Mean Winning Bid  Mean Reserve Price 
Regime One      
      
  United Kingdom  April 2000  4.21  0.09 
 Germany  June  2000  3.87  0.06 
 Netherlands  July  2000  1.08  0.09 
 Italy  October  2000  1.39  1.12 
 Austria  November  2000  0.57  0.51 
 Switzerland  December  2000  0.12  0.12 
 New  Zealand  January  2001  0.05  0.04 
      
Average    1.73 0.30 
Standard Deviation    1.66 0.38 
Regime Two      
      
 Belgium  March  2001  0.29  0.00 
 Singapore  April  2001  0.29  0.39 
  Greece   July 2001  0.28  0.38 
 Denmark  September  2001  0.63  0.00 
  Czech Republic  December 2001  0.11  0.21 
 Israel  December  2001  0.13  0.22 
      
Average    0.28 0.20 
Standard Deviation    0.22 0.16 
Regime Three      
      
 Taiwan  February  2002  0.37  0.25 
 Norway  September  2003  0.06  0.00 
 Bulgaria  March  2005  0.25  0.24 
 Latvia  April  2005  0.12  0.02 
 Denmark  December  2005  0.44  0.36 
 Georgia  May  2006  0.08  0.03 
 Indonesia  February  2006  0.02  0.00 
 Estonia  January  2007  0.13  0.12 
 Nigeria  March  2007  0.03  0.03 
 Norway  December  2007  0.05  0.00 
      
Average    0.17 0.12 
Standard Deviation    0.15 0.12 
      
Source: DotEcon Spectrum Awards database coverage; Note: Mean winning bid and mean reserve price are US$m 
MHz per million population. 
                                                      
19 An  F-statistic for different variances across Regime One and Regime Two (6.75 with 34 and 51 degrees of freedom) 
exceeds the critical value (1.66). Therefore, the Null hypothesis that the variances are equal is rejected. Accordingly, a 
test for difference-in-means is conducted which accounts for different variance across regimes. The t-statistic of 1.48 (41 
degrees of freedom) does not exceed the critical value (2.02 for a 5% significance level in a two-tailed test). Therefore, 
the Null hypothesis that the mean RESERVE from Regime One and Regime Two are equivalent is not rejected. 
Furthermore, an F-statistic for different variances across Regime Two and Regime Three (37.14 with 24 and 22 degrees 
of freedom) exceeds the critical value (2.03). Therefore, the Null hypothesis that the variances are equal is rejected. 
Accordingly, a test for difference-in-means is conducted which accounts for different variance across regimes. The t-
statistic of 2.58 (26 degrees of freedom) exceeds the critical value (2.06). Therefore, the Null hypothesis that the mean 
RESERVE from Regime Two and Regime Three are equivalent is rejected. An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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Table 4 and Table 5, respectively, present mean, standard deviation and definitions for the dependent 
and independent variables used in the regressions based on national 3G spectrum awards. While 
valuations are converted to United States dollars (US$), categorical (1, 2, 3 …) variables are 
transformed into binary (dummy) variables, e.g., when an entrant must be awarded at least one 
licence: ENTRANT is set equal to unity, and zero otherwise. In Table 4 the dependent variable to be 
analyzed is WBID (winning bid amount). The variable is typically considered by economists to reflect 
the value of the spectrum package to the winning operator. In particular, higher revenues can arise 
from product market extension to 3G spectrum, thus adding revenue streams otherwise not feasible 
from current activities. Synergistic benefits also arise from lower costs (e.g., savings may occur 
through improved productivity or network economies).
20 Either source of benefits may flow through to 
profit. 
 
Table 4. 3G Auction Dependent Variable Summary Statistics, 2000–07 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std  Dev.
     
WBID  = Winning bid value (US$m per MHz per million population); = 0, otherwise  0.66  1.34 
     
 
Figure 1 depicts 3G sample mean values for the auction reserve bid price (set by NRAs) and winning 
bid price (made by successful MNOs). Figure 1 demonstrates a decline in both the reserve and 
winning bid prices, and a narrowing of the margin between the winning bid and reserve prices. Such 
narrowing can result from several sources including learning-by-doing (e.g., from bidding experience) 
or an improved appreciation of the true worth of 3G business models and markets, both in the near and 
long term. 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that similar patterns are also apparent for individual winning bid activity (rather 
than just for annual mean winning bid activity). That is, the phenomena of declining price (measured 
in US$m per MHz per million population), and bid-reserve price spread narrowing holds for 
individual auction winning bid activity. Further, the observed winning bid price volatility (across 
auctions) illustrated by Figure 2 suggests that individual country factors are important in explaining 
                                                      
20  The spectral efficiency is the number of bits that can be sent per second over a channel of a given bandwidth (Gruber, 
2001: 62). Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
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winning bid price levels and the bid-reserve price spread. Accordingly, Table 5 lists variables (with 
definitions and sample summary statistics) that potentially explain such price movements. 
 
 
The variables contained in Table 5 identify: national economic and mobile market conditions (winning 
spectrum prices, Asian country), spectrum package attributes (award duration, revised offering, entrant 
priority, minimum spectrum bid price), licence award process (minimum deposit), and operator 
financial (annual license fees) and network (infrastructure sharing, population coverage) post-award 
obligations. 
 An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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Table 5. 3G Auction Independent Variable Summary Statistics, 2000–07 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std  Dev.
      
National Economic and Mobile Market conditions     
      
AINITIAL
a  = Average winning bid price (US$m)  1210.63  2507.65
      
ASIA  = 1, if Indonesia, Singapore or Taiwan; = 0, otherwise  0.14  0.35 
      
Spectrum package attributes     
      
DURATION  = License term (years)  17.81  2.97 
      
REVISED  = 1, if package is a re-offered licence; = 0, otherwise  0.10  0.30 
      
ENTRANT  = 1, if at least one licence must be awarded to entrant; = 0, otherwise 0.14  0.35 
      
RESERVE  = Minimum bid price (US$m per MHz per million population)  180.36  439.64
      
Licence award process     
      
DEPOSIT  = Initial deposit required (US$m)  10.48  22.75 
      
Post-award financial performance obligations     
      
ANNUAL  = Mean annual licence fee (US$m)  2.31  0.77 
      
Post-award network performance obligations     
      
SHARE  = 1, if infrastructure sharing is a licence requirement; = 0, otherwise  0.35  0.48 
      
COVER  = Population that must be covered by the network (percent)  0.55  0.31 
      
TIME  = Time to achieve required network coverage (years)  4.18  2.26 
      








≠ ∑  
5. Initial Data Analysis 
Prior to model estimation, national 3G award sample descriptive statistics are calculated. In particular, 
Table 6 through Table 9 list sample mean and standard deviation values for national auction and 
administrative (beauty contest and award) processes.
21 Table 6 and Table 7 concern 3G auction sample 
statistics for periods 2000–01 and 2002–07, respectively. Table 8 and Table 9 contain 3G 
administrative process sample statistics for the periods 2000–01 and 2002–07, respectively. Together 
these data suggest that the winning bids are different in character and magnitude by 3G spectrum 
                                                      
21  Countries that used awards to issue 3G spectrum licenses include Poland (2000), Liechtenstein (2000), Latvia (2000), the 
Czech Republic (2001), Egypt (2001) and Slovenia (2001). The average winning ‘bid’ from these awards is US$0.434m 
per MHz per million population. Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
10 
allocation process. In particular, the realized upper bound (maximum value) of spectrum winning bid 
is higher for auction processes for 2000–01, viz., US$5.48m (auction) compared to US$2.06m 
(administrative process), with the situation reversed in 2002–07, with mean realized winning bids for 
auctions and administrative processes at US$0.44m and US$0.93m, respectively. However, the mean 
WBID value is larger for auctions in both periods, i.e., US$1.13m (2000–01) and US$0.17m (2002–
07) compared to US$0.34m (2000–01) and US$0.11m (2002–07), respectively. Finally, Table 6 
through Table 9 also list the estimated slope coefficients for ACOMP (available licenses to bidders 
ratio), DURATION (licence term in years) and INCOME (GDP per capita) obtained from simple 
regressions on WBID. The coefficient estimates further suggest that the underlying process by which 
the spectrum bid values are determined is distinct. That is, for the auction regressions the estimated 
coefficients are opposite in sign to those reported in the administrative process regressions. 
Interestingly, Table 6 through Table 9 further suggests that a structural break occurred for both 
spectrum allocation processes after 2001. That is, the mean winning bid falls substantially from 
US$1.13m (2000–01) to US$0.17m (2002–07), while the corresponding values for the administrative 
processes are US$0.34m (2000–01) and US$0.11m (2002–07), respectively.  
As a group, the findings reported in this section suggest modeling the behavior of 3G auction 
spectrum winning bids requires the specification and estimation of censored regression models. 
Additionally, any such modeling must consider the structural break in the sample data between the 
periods 2000–01 and 2002–07. Accordingly, the approach employed below is to concentrate on the 
auction sample and estimate a censored regression incorporating a dummy variable to allow for a 
downward level shift in WBID values after 2000–01.
22 
Table 6. Selected 3G Auction Sample Statistics, 2000–01 
Variable Minimum  Maximum  Mean Standard  Dev.  Coefficient 
         
WBID 0.00  5.58  1.13  1.46  – 
ACOMP 0.38  2.00 1.07  0.42  –1.99873*** 
DENSITY 14.38  6745.76  641.29  1649.34  –0.00004 
INCOME 6077.5  34802.0  21452.8  6918.5  –0.00000 
 
Notes: no. obs = 55; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 7. Selected 3G Auction Sample Statistics, 2002–07 
Variable Minimum  Maximum  Mean Standard  Dev.  Coefficient 
         
WBID 0.01  0.44  0.17  0.15  – 
ACOMP 0.25  1.00 0.78  0.22  –0.13788 
DENSITY 14.77 698.95 221.92  260.60  0.00039*** 
INCOME 1160.8  83484.8  12799.4  20377.0  0.00000 
 
Notes: no. obs = 25; *** significant at 1%. 
                                                      
22  This variable is included in Stage One of estimation. An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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Table 8. Selected 3G Administrative Process Sample Statistics, 2000–01 
Variable Minimum  Maximum  Mean Standard  Dev.  Coefficient 
         
WBID 0.00  2.06  0.34  0.54  – 
ACOMP 0.40  3.00 1.01  0.57  0.68809*** 
DENSITY 13.87 483.46 128.89  147.02  0.00012 
INCOME 4453.8  36811.0  20835.5  10705.8  –0.00000 
 
Notes: no. obs = 32; administrative award is lottery, beauty contest or hybrid process; *** significant at 1%.  
Table 9. Selected 3G Administrative Process Sample Statistics, 2002–07 
Variable Minimum  Maximum  Mean Standard  Dev. Coefficient 
          
WBID 0.00  0.93  0.11  0.16  – 
ACOMP 0.20  2.00 1.08  0.47  0.01601 
DENSITY 8.41 294.66  107.42  84.76  –0.00055* 
INCOME 1159.2  64403.8  15272.8  16852.5  0.00000 
 
Notes: no. obs = 45; administrative award is lottery, beauty contest or hybrid process; * significant at 10%.  
6. Regression Model Specification 
A censored regression model is estimated to obtain estimates of the impact of NRA controlled 
variables on winning national WBID values. However, with the average winning bid price 
(AINITIAL) included as an argument in the WBID estimating equation, simultaneity bias may be 
introduced. In particular, a rise in AINITIAL may increase national WBID values, and vice versa. 
Consequently, estimates of the effect of AINITIAL on WBID are potentially understated. To avoid the 
problem Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) techniques are applied. The 
Stage One estimation requires that IVs correlated with AINITIAL and exogenous to WBID are 
regressed on AINITIAL. Predicted values from this regression (PAINITIAL) are substituted for 
AINITIAL in the Stage Two regression on WBID. The independent variables included in the Stage 
One regression are the national and mobile market condition variables contained in Table 10 below.
23 
Table 10. 3G Auction National and Mobile Market Variable Summary Statistics, 2000–07 
Variable Definition  Mean  Std  Dev. 
      
ACOMP  = Available licenses to bidders (ratio)  0.99  0.39 
      
DENSITY  = National population per square kilometer (persons)  525.08  1418.16 
      
INCOME  = GDP per capita (US$ thousands)  19054.89  12689.53 
      
SHIFT  = 1, if auction was held in 2000–2001; = 0, otherwise  0.72  0.45 
      
 
                                                      
23  A Hausman test (1978) for the endogeneity of AINITIAL is conducted. Namely, WBID is regressed on Table 5 
arguments (including AINITAL, the potentially endogenous variable) and the Stage One residuals. The p-value for the 
residuals (0.00) rejects the Null Hypothesis that the error term is uncorrelated with AINITIAL. That is, the concern 
regarding simultaneity is justified. Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
12 
These mobile market (ACOMP, DENSITY) and national economic (INCOME, SHIFT) variables are 
selected as instruments as they are assumed correlated with AINITIAL but exogenous to WBID. For 
example, higher per capita national income is positively correlated with MNO licence valuations via 
potential market size (which is associated with an ability to charge higher service prices). Also, higher 
population densities enhance licence values through achievable scale economies. Additionally, more 
competitive auction processes are positively correlated with winning spectrum bid prices. Finally, 
observed post-2001 realized spectrum prices are lower, perhaps reflecting learning effects. 
The Stage Two estimation recognizes the censored nature of WBID data.
24 In particular, dependent 
variable WBID is censored as only winning bid values greater than the reserve bid price are observed. 
That is, the observed price must not only be the largest value among all bidders, but must also exceed 
the NRA specified minimum spectrum bid price. When the maximum bid (based on operator 
valuation) does not exceed the minimum spectrum bid price then the associated ‘observed’ price is 
zero. The regression model based on the preceding discussion is referred to as the censored regression 
(or Tobit) model. The regression is obtained by making the mean of the censored model correspond to 
a classical regression model. The general formulation is usually given in terms of an index function, 
 
* ', β ε =+ ij ij ij yx  
* 0  if   0, ij ij yy = ≤  
**  if   0, ij ij ij yy y = >  
where  1 (1, ,..., )' = ii i p x xx  is a vector of  p  covariates which affect Spectrum Package i valuations 
and  01 (,, . . . ,) ' β ββ β = jj j j p  is a corresponding vector of parameters to be estimated. The stochastic 
component  , εij  consists of unobserved factors that explain the marginal spectrum valuations of 
Operator j. Each εij  is drawn from a  J -variate Normal distribution with zero conditional mean and 
variance, where  ~( 0 , ) . ε Σ N  For a randomly-drawn observation from the population, which may or 
may not be censored, 
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24  Maddala (1983) considers censored values occur when variables are limited in their range because of some underlying 
stochastic choice mechanism (e.g., data on consumer durable expenditures). This contrasts truncated observations that are 
incomplete due to a selection process in the design of the study (e.g., negative income tax experiment data). Thus, 
truncation changes the sample size while censoring does not. An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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Finally, the estimated coefficients are comprised of both the impact of changes in the observed WBID 
and the probability any bid is a winning WBID value (McDonald and Moffitt, 1980). For coefficient 
values above the limit the marginal effects is scaled for the probability that the latent variable is 
observed.
25 Limdep calculates the conditional mean of the model at the mean of the independent 
variables to scale the coefficients. 
7. Estimation 
Estimation is via Limdep version 9.0. Stage One parameter estimates are listed in Table 11. The 
reported F-Statistic exceeds ten and indicates that the instruments are suitable, a necessary condition 
for an unbiased 2SLS estimator (Stock and Watson, 2002: 350). The Stage Two censored regression 
model estimates reported in Table 12 indicate a significant Lagrange Multiplier test of model 
restrictions. Also, ANOVA (22%) and DECOMP (35%) fit measures show improvement in the log-
likelihood relative to the restricted model. 
Table 11. Stage One Estimates 
Variable Coefficient 
  
INCOME  0.04469** 
(2.239) 
DENSITY  -0.26755 
(-1.394) 
ACOMP  -1295.3** 
(-2.570) 







Notes: t statistics in parentheses. ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
                                                      
25  Limdep provides a scale factor, analogous to the sample proportion of observations above the limit, to compute the 
marginal effects of the independent variables (Greene, 2008). Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
14 
 
Table 12. Censored Regression Estimates 
Category Variable  Coefficient  Marginal  Effect 
     




     
     











      
      
















      
      




      
      




      
      












      
      
 n  83   
 ANOVA  0.220765   
 DECOMP  0.350991   
 Log  likelihood  –108.9118   
      
Notes: (a) PAINITIAL is predicted AINITIAL values. t statistics in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Standard errors are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. 
Further, Table 13 demonstrates that the estimated model predicted values track well for 2000–2007 
(0.00 Absolute Average Deviation). However, the model performs less well for the sub-period 2002–
2007 (0.03 Absolute Average Deviation). Finally, Table 14 reports joint significance tests for the 
explanatory variable categories: national economic and mobile market conditions; spectrum package 
attributes; and network obligations. The tests reject the null hypotheses that the variable groupings are 
insignificant. An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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Table 13. 3G Auction Predicted and Actual Mean Winning Bid Values, 2000–07 
Period / Region  Actual  Predicted  Absolute Average Deviation
      
2000–01 1.13  1.12  0.01 
2002–07 0.17  0.20  0.03 
2000–07 0.86  0.86  0.00 
      
Africa 0.03  0.10  0.07 
Australasia 0.20  0.20  0.00 
Europe 1.16  1.17  0.01 
Middle East  0.13  0.00  0.13 
      
Note: Winning bids are US$m per MHz per million population. 
 
Table 14. Joint Significance Tests 
Category Variable  Wald  statistic 
 















Notes: *** significant at 1%. The above categories are tested as they contain several variables. 
Turning to the impact of the explanatory variables on the 3G winning bid value (WBID) several 
distinct patterns emerge from examining Table 12. First, national economic and mobile market 
condition variables are individually significant in explaining winning bid behavior. In particular, 
higher winning bids occur when current prices are high (PAINITIAL = 0.00014) and for Asian 
countries (ASIA = 0.36794). For variables describing spectrum package attributes, revised licenses 
(REVISED = 0.47474) and reserve bid price (RESERVE = 1.03052) have positive impacts. 
Importantly, reserve prices are specified by the NRA in the tender document. Table 12 also indicates 
that post-award financial obligations imposed by NRAs are important in the decision calculus applied 
by MNOs in their bidding. For instance, winning bid values are less likely to increase with higher 
post-award payment obligations (ANNUAL = –0.00576). Finally, of the network obligations imposed 
on operators, infrastructure sharing (SHARE = 1.00450) has a positive independent impact on WBID 
values. Additionally, the portion of the population which must be covered by the license (COVER = –
1.35588) has a negative impact on winning bid while the estimated TIME (time to achieve required 
network coverage post award) coefficient of 0.25557 suggests that operators view these obligations as 
binding on their post-award behavior. 
Finally, Table 15 contains elasticity estimates for policy relevant (under NRA control) variables. 
Elasticity values that are either elastic (or near elastic) have a more important impact on operator 
auction bidding behavior. The COVERAGE (portion of the population which must be covered by the 
license) elasticity value (evaluated at the sample mean of the independent variables) suggests that Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
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when the coverage requirement increases by 1% above the mean there is a 0.86% fall in WBID value 
(reduction in the perceived value of the licence to the winning bidder). Finally, the TIME (time to 
achieve NRA specified network geographic coverage obligations) is perceived as binding by 
operators. Importantly, the more distant is the assessment of achieving these objectives the greater is 
the realized winning bid. The absolute values of the estimated elasticities for REVISED, RESERVE, 
ANNUAL and SHARE are less than 0.5 in magnitude. That is, the higher the reservation price 
(RESERVE), the higher the winning bid; the higher the annual payment (ANNUAL), the lower the 
winning bid; and the incidence of a re-offered license (REVISED) or infrastructure sharing obligation 
(SHARE), the higher the winning bid.  
Table 15. NRA Control Variable Elasticity Estimates 
Category Variable  Elasticity 
    
Spectrum package attributes  DURATION  –0.74 
    
 REVISED  0.05 
    
 ENTRANT  –0.03 
    
 RESERVE  0.26 
    
Licence award process  DEPOSIT  0.13 
    
Financial obligations  ANNUAL  –0.15 
    
Network obligations  SHARE  0.41 
    
 COVER  –0.86 
    
 TIME  1.24 
 
Note: Bold indicates coefficient is significant 
8. Conclusions 
During the past decade there has been considerable published research examining auction behavior. 
The studies are primarily focused, presumably due to the data available, on the optimal design of 
auctions and their performance. Indicators of auction ‘success’ are typically some measure of 
participation (more is better), an absence of collusive bidding behavior and that winning prices 
accurately reflect, more or less well, the ‘true’ value of the spectrum to winning bidders (that the 
auction is efficient). Questions that are not adequately addressed by this theoretical approach are the 
relative (quantitative) importance of particular aspects of an auction’s design to the achievement of 
desired outcomes. Accordingly, the modeling approach employed in this study is based on the premise 
that the form of an instrument matters for 3G auctions, and that NRAs have an opportunity through 
this design to achieve desired goals. In particular, this study addresses the questions: What is the 
relative importance of ‘macro’ (environmental) variables, viz á viz, NRA choice (auction design) 
variables on auction outcomes? In what type of auction design (magnitude) are NRA-specified auction 
designs likely to succeed? What can be said about the relationship between post-auction award 
obligations and spectrum valuations? 
The short answer to these questions (in the context of this sample) is that less binding (far term) 
post-award coverage obligations enhance spectrum value, and not surprisingly, that when the initial 
value is close to the ‘true’ operator value of the spectrum then the winning bid is higher as the An Econometric Analysis of 3G Auction Spectrum Valuations 
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‘winner’s curse’ risk is diminished. A limitation of the analysis is that the sampling frame only allows 
consideration of national 3G spectrum licence bidding activity. A more thorough analysis would 
consider the impact on ‘regional’ auction bidding. Erik Bohlin, Gary Madden and Aaron Morey 
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